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1. INTRODUCTION
Inequality and sustainability are two issues that dominate discussions today, but 
are less often discussed together. Inequality, of course, is an important Kaldorian 
preoccupation, especially in the classic paper on the determinants of factor shares 
(Kaldor 1955–1956). Moreover, his massive work on tax reforms was primarily 
motivated by the goal of reducing inequality. Kaldor was not concerned with 
sustainability – it really only became a dominant preoccupation after his death. 
Yet today, I believe that sustainability is the most important question of the 21st 
century – since the wellbeing and even the existence of future generations de-
pend on it.
This paper explores the relationship between inequality and sustainability. It 
starts by defining both terms and identifying relevant criteria for determining the 
best distribution (Section 2). The criteria are divided into considerations of jus-
tice and of instrumentality. These are discussed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. 
Section 5 takes more meta considerations into account, and Section 6 comes to 
some conclusions
2. DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA
In assessing inequality, there are two big questions that need to be considered: 
inequality among whom? and inequality of what? For both questions, modifica-
tions of the usual approaches are needed if one is to focus on the sustainability 
issue.
Among whom? The normal classification includes individuals within a soci-
ety – vertical inequality; individuals across the globe (global vertical inequality); 
inequality among groups (horizontal inequality); and among countries (inter-
country inequality). From the perspective of the environment, each of these types 
of inequality are relevant, but we must add an additional one: inequality across 
generations (including the unborn), i.e. generational inequality.
Inequality of what? Typically, the focus of those concerned with distribution 
is on income, and sometimes land, or wealth more generally (e.g. Piketty 2014). 
However, with a broader approach to development objectives, a broader answer 
is needed to the ”of what” question. A number of people have advocated going 
beyond income as the prime object: for example, Sen (1985, 1999) has suggest-
ed that the objective of development should be the expansion of capabilities or 
freedoms, or what people can be or do; others (Layard 2011; Graham 2011) have 
suggested that the objective should be to maximise happiness; those working on 
horizontal inequalities have argued that relevant dimensions of such inequali-
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ties include political power, cultural respect, and socio-economic factors (Stewart 
2002, 2008). Focusing on sustainability suggests that inequality of environmental 
resource use and outcomes should be a prime concern. Clearly, the appropriate 
answer to the “of what” question depends on the purpose of analysis. 
Why worry about inequality? Concern with inequality arises first from con-
cern with justice; and secondly, instrumental issues, or how inequality affects 
other desired objectives. From an environmental perspective, both instrumental 
and justice considerations are relevant.
Economists generally tend to take an instrumental line, evaluating inequality 
in terms of its impact on economic growth. This was not always so. Pigou (1920) 
in particular advocated the distribution which would maximise a society’s utility, 
and argued that since people have “equal capacity for satisfaction and diminish-
ing marginal utility of income”, assuming diminishing marginal utility as income 
increases, an egalitarian distribution would be optimal. However, Robbins (1945: 
156–157) challenged the assumption of comparability of satisfaction, arguing 
that ”in our hearts we do not regard different men’s satisfactions from similar 
means as equally valuable”. Economists broadly accepted Robbins’ argument, 
and hence the prime focus has been on achieving a Pareto optimal situation , and 
therefore on inequality only as it affected output, i.e. taking an instrumental rela-
tionship with economic growth. 
However, while economists take an instrumental approach, philosophers are 
concerned with justice: for example, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls. As Rousseau 
(1762) stated:
“Whichever way we look at it, we always return to the same conclusion: … 
the social pact establishes equality among the citizens in that they all pledge 
themselves under the same conditions and all enjoy the same rights.” 
The reformulation of the social contract by Rawls (2004), by which a just dis-
tribution is the distribution that people would choose if under a veil of ignorance 
as to their own position in the income or wealth hierarchy, led him to conclude 
that a just distribution would be one that maximises the position of the poorest, 
i.e. this justifies maximin.
As Sen (2009) points out, we do not have to know what a completely just so-
ciety would look like, as long as one can see the direction of travel towards more 
justice. From this perspective, Rousseau and Rawls would agree that the present 
global and national distribution is unjust.
Considering justice, from an environmental perspective, we need to consid-
er what is just within a country across individuals (vertical inequality), across 
groups (horizontal inequality) and among countries (inter-country inequality); 
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and, above all, across generations. Taking an instrumental perspective, any type 
of inequality that affects the valued outcomes, i.e. environmental consequences, 
is relevant. This is an empirical issue, which we consider below. 
Sustainability can be defined in many ways and there are numerous indica-
tors. In principle, it could be interpreted as the ability to sustain a pattern of 
development. With this definition, we need to consider political and economic 
events that might impede sustained development. The extent of inequality is 
highly relevant (and inimical) to political and economic sustainability: see Stew-
art (2008) on how horizontal inequalities increase violent political conflict, and 
Stiglitz (2012) and Berg et al. (2008) on how vertical inequality affects eco-
nomic sustainability adversely.
In this paper, sustainability is interpreted as environmental sustainability. An 
environmentally sustainable pattern of development is defined as one that en-
sures that our current behaviour does not restrict the opportunities open to future 
generations. There are numerous aspects of the environment, which are or may 
be threatened by our present economic activities, ranging from the number of 
natural species in the world, the fertility and productivity of the soil, and so on, 
to global warming which threatens many aspects of life, including ultimately life 
itself. To avoid too wide a canvas, in this paper the focus is on carbon emissions 
as the most threatening to the sustainability of long-term human wellbeing.
Environmental sustainability has been categorised into ”strong” sustainability 
and “weak” sustainability. Weak sustainability assumes substitutability between 
natural capital and manufactured capital. Weak sustainability can thus be assured 
by a sufficient savings rate to generate non-natural capital as a substitute for the 
natural capital that is depleted during development (Neumayer 2010). Some sub-
stitutability is clearly possible – for example, the impact of carbon emissions can 
be reduced by investments in sequestration. However, the substitutability appears 
to be imperfect, and I shall therefore focus on strong sustainability, assuming that 
we should aim for an absolute limit on total global emissions.1 This is justified 
by scientists’ reports, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). For example, The Living Plant Report (2014) shows:
–  “Humanity’s demand on the planet is more than 50% larger than what nature 
can renew, jeopardizing the well-being of humans as well as populations of 
mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish.” 
–  Humanity’s ecological footprint more than doubled since 1961. The main source 
is growing carbon emissions, but also declining forests, declining species.
1  Neumayer (2010) concludes from a survey of the evidence that there is limited substitutability 
in relation to emissions and other forms of pollution, but reasonable substitutability for the 
inputs that go into the production of goods.
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–  The global ecological footprint exceeds earth’s renewable capacity by at least 
50%.
–  Of the 9 ecological barriers, three have already been exceeded: bio-diversity 
loss, climate change, and nitrogen.
Scientists estimate that 350 ppm (parts per million) is the “safe” level for car-
bon in atmosphere (Hansen et al. 2013), while 450 ppm is an upper limit for 
achieving a 50:50 chance of limiting average global warming to 20 (OECD 2012). 
Actual concentration recently exceeded 400 ppm: at present rates of growth of 
emissions, 450 ppm will be reached by 2030.
Hence, here I assume a “hard” limit to total global emissions. This is highly rel-
evant to distribution because it means that we cannot increase the emissions of the 
lower emitters without reducing that of the higher emitters – in contrast to assump-
tions about resources without a hard limit, such as incomes. The central issue then 
is what would be the optimal distribution of the total emissions we can allow.
To answer this, we need to return to the two issues noted above, as critical in 
determining the optimal distribution: what is a just distribution from an environ-
mental perspective? And what are the instrumental effects, or how does inequal-
ity affect sustainability outcomes?
3. JUSTICE
We need to consider environmental justice in relation to people living today; and 
across generations.
3.1. Justice across generations
Justice across generations requires that our actions today should take into account 
the impact on well-being of future generations. This consideration is, of course, 
the major – implicit – justification for the concern with sustainability and the hard 
limits just discussed. Yet it is not allowed for in the way investment decisions are 
made, in particular the adoption of a discount rate.
A discount rate implies giving less value to benefits received by future gen-
erations than to those we get today. Because of the law of compound interest, 
discount rates have a large effect. For example, with a discount rate of 5.0%, 
$100 25 years from now is worth just $29.5 today, and $100 in one hundred years 
would be worth three-quarters of a dollar. Hence, it is necessary to explore the 
justification for discounting the future.
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Justification for discounting: one reason is that we see the future less clearly 
than we see what happens today – Pigou called this our ‘‘telescopic vision”. But 
this is not a justification for discounting, rather a description of what we do and 
value. A more rational justification is that because of economic growth, future 
generations will be better off, so that even with discounting, their well-being may 
be equivalent or better than today’s. But the implications of climate change are to 
question this. Future generations may be much worse off, as seems quite likely 
on present trends. Another justification is that technology change will give future 
generations access to technologies that reverse or stop some of the climate change 
effects. But many of the climate-induced changes seem irreversible, at least for the 
next century or so, such as melting of the icecap or reduction of bio-diversity.
Can we apply Rawls’ approach to future generations? They are clearly not part 
of any contemporary social contract and Rawls argued that his theory only ap-
plied within a jurisdiction with a shared government, not even across contempo-
rary countries; the same argument might be used across generations because there 
is no government that includes future generations. But I reject this. As recognised 
by human rights approaches, every human should be treated equally, as being hu-
man. It is easy to extend Rawls’ approach: behind the veil of ignorance, we may 
not know when we will live as well as not knowing where and in which class. 
Hence, we should adopt maximin across generations. This, indeed, provides the 
justification for the definition of environmental sustainability put forward – i.e. 
that our current actions should not restrict the choices of future generations.
I conclude that justice across generations makes it very difficult to justify any 
discounting. Yet, despite low or even negative “official” discount rates, actual 
borrowing rates are high, involving heavy discounting of future well-being.2 
Consequently, the benefits of investments to future generations are heavily dis-
counted. 
3.2. Justice across today’s global population
The present distributions both of the “ecological footprint”3 and of CO2 emissions 
per person are highly unequal across countries. Inequality in ecological footprint 
2  It might be thought that the very low official rates of interest prevailing in 2016 (in some 
countries even negative) would lead to equally low private borrowing rates. But because of 
costs and risk aversion in banks, this is not the case. A review of commercial bank lending 
rates shows great variation ranging between 5 and 20%. 
3  This is an estimate of the amount of biologically productive land and water (biocapacity) 
needed to produce resources that an individual (or population) consumes and to absorb carbon 
emissions generated, with current technologies.
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is shown in the diagram below (for 2010). High-income countries are estimated to 
have five times the ecological footprint of low-income countries (WWF 2014). 
When it comes to carbon emissions, the inequalities are extreme. 
Emissions per head of low-income countries are a tiny fraction of those of 
rich countries (Table 1); those of middle-income countries are 38% of rich coun-
tries (although their total emissions exceed those of rich countries because of the 
greater population). Given the hard limits, justice could be defined as equality 
of emissions per head, although a somewhat different conclusion might emerge 
with maximin, given different ratios of emissions to output. Moreover, we must 
note that these estimates do not allow for the emissions associated with consump-
tion (consumption of imports), but are emissions of production, and much of rich 
Figure 1. Ecological footprint per person, selected countries, 2012 (global hectares)
Source: Global Footprint Network.
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countries’ consumption of carbon-intensive manufactures come from middle-
income countries. 
The conclusion must be that environmental justice requires far less inequality 
in emissions than observed today, without defining precisely what a just distribu-
tion would look like. This, in turn, implies massively more egalitarian income 
distribution since there is a close association between income per capita and 
emissions. For 2007, the ecological footprint (which is consumption-based) of 
the richest third countries was 5.5 global hectares per person, the middle third 
was 2.4 and the poorest third 1.4 (calculated from Ewing et al. 2010).4
Unfortunately, actions are rarely determined by considerations of justice; in-
strumental arguments tend to be more powerful. Hence, we now turn to instru-
mental issues. The basic question is: given hard limit on emissions, what distribu-
tion of income is likely to contribute to reducing emissions?
4. INSTRUMENTALITY
The instrumental arguments concern how distribution of incomes affects global 
sustainability. Does more inequality increase or reduce emissions? Arguments 
have been put forward on both sides. For example, Ravaillon et al. (2000: 651) 
4  “A global hectare is a common unit that encompasses the average productivity of all the bio-
logically productive land and sea area in the world in a given year. … The Footprint tracks 
current human demand on nature in terms of the area required to supply the resources used 
and absorb the CO2 emitted in providing goods and services. Trade is accounted for by allo-
cating this demand to the country that ultimately consumes these goods and services”. (http://
www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/frequently_asked_questions/#method2: 
accessed September 19, 2016).
Table 1. The global picture of production emissions, 2010
Countries Population, 
million
Output per 
head, $
O/P
Emissions per unit 
of output 
(CO2 metric tons 
per $ of output 
E/O
Total emissions 
of production, 
kt (1000 t)
Emissions 
per head, 
kt 
E/P
Rich 1,287 34,927 0.4 17,980 13,970
Middle-income 4,788 3,792 1.4 25,418 5,309
Low-income  810  515 0.7 289 356
World 6,885 9,224 0.7 43,724 6,350
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Note: We use World Bank classification of countries into different income groups.
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argue that “Higher inequality, both between and within countries is associated 
with lower emissions at given average incomes”.
In diametric disagreement, Boyce (1994) and Torras – Boyce (1998) hypoth-
esise that the more unequally power (and income) is distributed, the greater the 
pollution: 
“The total magnitude of environmental harm depends on the extent of in-
equality. Societies with wider inequalities of wealth and power will tend 
to have more environmental harm. Conversely, societies with relatively 
modest degrees of economic and political disparities will tend to have less 
environmental harm” (Boyce 1994: 7–8).
The main justification advanced for the hypothesis that higher inequality re-
duces emissions is that the desire to reduce emissions (the marginal propensity 
to emit – MPE) rises with income (it is a type of luxury good) and this translates 
into consumer choices (more services, fewer material goods) and into political 
support for regulations. Ravallion et al. cite Dasgupta et al.’s (1995) 31 country 
study showing that rising income increased the demand for regulation. Changing 
MPE can be due to changing patterns of consumption – for example, increasing 
the proportion of expenditure on services, which involves lower emissions than 
material goods. On the other hand, Boyce and others argue that because the poor 
suffer the main consequences of pollution, while the rich bear most of the costs of 
policies to control it, there are powerful political economy reasons for expecting 
more unequal societies (with inequality in political power and incomes assumed 
to be highly correlated) to take less action in relation to pollution than more equal 
ones. Thus, Boyce argues that more equal societies would be more regulatory, 
while Ravallion et al. argue the opposite – that they would be less regulatory than 
more unequal societies.
Both types of arguments can be interpreted to apply to inter-country as well 
as intra-country distribution. Both are dependent on empirical assumptions 
about consumer behaviour and political power. It seems plausible that both over-
 generalise. For example, it is arguable that the MPE may be higher for middle-
income countries than for low-income ones since their production and consump-
tion is increasingly composed of material goods, and then it may decline for the 
richest countries. The same might be true within societies. In addition, within 
societies, variations in the MPE by income group might vary according to the 
average incomes of the society.
To shed light on which of these positions is correct, i.e. whether emissions rise 
or fall according to the distribution of incomes, we need to turn to the empirical 
evidence.
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4.1. Inter-country evidence 
Table 1 above showed that average emissions per unit of output is lowest in high-
income countries and highest in middle-income countries. However, as noted, 
these are measures based on production, not consumption. As rich countries im-
port many material goods from middle-income ones, consumption adjusted ratios 
would reduce the middle-income and raise the high-income ratio. Yet estimates of 
the ecological footprint per unit of output also show high-income countries with 
the lowest ratio. Hence, if the average is a guide to the marginal, then minimising 
emissions would actually require regressive redistribution across countries. This 
is reflected in what has come to be known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
(EKC) (Grossman – Kruger 1995; Selden – Song 1994; Shafik 1994), in which, ac-
cording to some authors, pollutants peak, in absolute terms, at about average world 
income. However, Grossman – Kruger (1995) do not include carbon emissions, but 
explore local pollutants; Shafik (1994) finds that the relationship varies according 
to the pollutant, and in relation to carbon emissions, there is a continuous increase 
with rising per capita incomes, while Selden – Song (1994) find that for carbon 
emissions, the quadratic term, while negative is not significant. Yet Constantini – 
Martini (2006) find a significant Kuznets relationship for emissions. Ravallion et 
al. (2000) estimate that transferring 5% from the income of the richest five coun-
tries to the poorest five countries would increase emissions by 2.4%. These studies 
relate to the late 1990s and early 2000s, and are based on production.
Like the original Kuznets curve, the relationship identified is between levels of 
income per capita and emissions per capita – i.e. average, not marginal emissions 
in relation to output. Grubb et al. (1999) explored the relationship between growth 
and emissions, and found that the US and UK had almost constant emissions per 
head 1950–1995, despite growth in GDP per capita. But there was a strong re-
lationship between growth in income and in emissions in middle-income indus-
trialising countries. A study of 69 countries for 2000–2014 found 35 countries 
(all high-income) which reduced their emissions while growing (CarbonBrief 
Table 2. CO2 change by income level, 2000–2014
Countries CO2 change, Mt CO2 change, % GDP change, %
Intensity (CO2/
GDP) change, %
Average low-
income 4.76 1.38 1.05 0.29
Average middle-
income 169.16 0.90 1.03 –0.02
Average high-
income 9.97 0.29 0.50 –0.12
Source: Derived from Carbon Brief data.
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2016). A much larger sample, 216 countries, found 21 (again all high-income) cut 
their emissions while growing between 2000–2013, using a consumption-based 
measure. Low-income countries showed an increase in carbon-intensity (from 
a very low level), middle-income countries’ intensity was roughly stable, and 
high-income countries’ intensity fell, though for the world as a whole emissions 
rose (Table 2). This information suggests that increasing inter-country inequality 
would reduce emissions. However, the data do not actually measure the MPE, or 
elasticity of emissions with respect to income growth, as the change in emissions 
could be due to technology change affecting all production, and growth at the 
margin may increase emissions by more (Stavins 2016).
4.2. Within country inequality
In a cross-country study of 42 countries for the years 1975–1992, Ravallion et 
al. (2000) shows that higher income inequality reduces emissions, but the impact 
is smaller at higher average income levels. Economic growth also reduces the 
adverse impact of higher inequality on emissions. Heerink et al. (2001) come to 
similar findings: greater inequality is associated with lower emissions. But others 
have found no significant impact, for example Borghese (2006) and Lamla – Stern 
(2010). Later studies have identified more complex relationships. Grunewald et 
al. (2012) find for 1960–2008 that increasing inequality decreases emissions in 
relatively equal countries, but the opposite prevails in very unequal ones. These 
studies are all production-based. Using a consumption-based indicator of emis-
sions, Jorgenson et al. (2016) show that the relationships vary across countries 
and time for 67 countries between 1991–2008. Inequality in high-income coun-
tries was negatively associated with emissions, but the association became posi-
tive; for middle-income countries, there was a consistent and increasing negative 
effect, so that more inequality reduced emissions; and for low-income countries, 
there was no relationship.
Results appear to differ for other environmental indicators. For example, Tor-
ras – Boyce (1998) find support for Boyce’s (1994) claims that greater inequality 
in political power increases pollution, with data from US states in the 1990s using 
a general index of environmental stress. However, this is questioned by Scruggs 
(1998) using cross-country data, who finds that the association between political 
and economic inequality and the environment varies according to the environ-
mental indicator adopted, and concludes: “On the whole, this evidence refutes the 
equality hypothesis. Once the income effects predicted by standard economics 
are controlled for, neither income inequality nor political inequality have consist-
ently discernible effects on the environmental quality indicators considered here” 
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(p. 268). However, in line with the Boyce hypothesis, Mikkelson et al. (2007) 
find that greater income inequality is associated with loss in biodiversity across 
countries and among US states.
There seem to be few studies of distribution and emissions in specific coun-
tries. However, investigating the impact of income on emissions among urban 
households in China, Golley – Meng (2012) find that higher income households 
generate more emissions than lower income ones, with a slightly increasing MPE, 
so that redistribution would reduce emissions.
What can we conclude from these rather complex and conflicting results? 
–  Most evidence on inter-country distribution suggests that more equal distribu-
tion is likely to increase emissions. 
–  For intra-country distribution:
–  Neither the Ravallion, nor the (opposite) Boyce hypotheses are firmly es-
tablished. However, on carbon emissions, most studies show that greater 
inequality reduces emissions, particularly in middle-income countries – al-
though this is contradicted by the China study.
–  Nonetheless, the perverse results (from a justice perspective) seem to be 
moderated for high-income countries and may differ for high inequality and 
low inequality countries.
–  For non-carbon pollution, the few studies show a negative relationship be-
tween inequality and environmental degradation (i.e. no trade-off between 
reducing pollution and justice).
–  The relationships seem to be changing over time. This suggests potential for 
affecting the relationships by deliberate policy to that effect.
5. MORE MACRO OR META CONSIDERATIONS
Up to now, the paper has focused on how the MPE might be affected by inter- and 
intra-country distribution, given present growth ambitions and global regulations. 
Yet these two elements are critical for CO2 outcomes, and in turn are probably 
affected by distribution.
5.1. The growth motive 
A major cause of rising emissions is economic growth, as the following tautology 
indicates (a modification of the IPAT equation of Erlich – Holdren5):
5 Adapted by many, including Commoner 1972 and Speth 1990.
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E = P x O/P x E/O
In this equation, total emissions (E) are equivalent to:
–  Population size (P) times
–  Output per head (O/P) times
–  Emissions per unit of output (E/O).
Technology (here represented by E/O) is improving, as shown earlier, and 
population growth is slowing in the world as a whole and in most countries. It 
remains the case, however, that at any point in time, when population growth rate 
and technology change is given, emissions growth is determined by growth in 
output per head. This is broadly indicated by the way in which emissions reflect 
output growth, as shown in Figure 2. Above we noted that some countries (21 out 
of 256) managed to reduce CO2 while experiencing growth of incomes, yet this 
does not detract from the basic relationship between growth and emissions – 
while it shows that technology is improving, for the technology available at a 
point in time the higher the growth the more the emissions (Stavins 2016). Only 
if the technology improvement depended entirely on additional output would this 
link be broken. 
We need therefore to consider why countries give such emphasis to economic 
growth. For countries with massive absolute poverty, the elimination of poverty 
is a major element in motivation – but one that could clearly be more quickly 
Figure 2. Global annual GDP growth vs. CO2 emissions growth 
Source: Nuticelli (2015), derived from World Bank and International Energy Agency data.
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achieved if growth were accompanied by redistribution. For other countries, 
where absolute poverty has been eliminated – i.e. upper-middle and high-income 
countries – a major motive is to “catch-up” with higher-income countries. Yet for 
middle-income countries to catch-up with the existing levels of per capita income 
of high-income countries itself involves huge increases in emissions.
If low- and middle-income countries grew enough to catch up with the present 
level of emissions of rich countries, and adopted the technology currently used 
by rich countries, global emissions would more than double. The additional emis-
sions on these assumptions would be 47,700 kt, which is equivalent to 1.4 times 
present emissions. As noted earlier, the present concentration of carbon in the 
atmosphere is already above the level some consider as safe. 
Consequently, the catch-up scenario to the present levels of income of rich 
countries, on the basis of current technology, involves a non-sustainable level of 
global emissions. Moreover, the rich countries’ output will also continue to grow 
with present policies, increasing the catch-up target. Probably the biggest source of 
unsustainable emissions in the medium term stems from the process of catch-up. 
Redistribution of income across countries would help catch up. Indeed, com-
plete convergence could be attained without any rise in emissions, by sharing in-
comes evenly across the world. Average global income is around $10,000, which 
is way above any poverty line, and this is the level that would be achieved by 
distributing income evenly across the countries of the world. Countries with av-
erage incomes of $10,000 include Costa Rica, Lebanon, Panama and Turkey, all 
of which have basically eliminated poverty. A level of income of $10,000 per 
head is more than double that of middle-income countries as a group, and is 36% 
more than upper middle-income countries. Such radical redistribution would ful-
fil Raworth’s doughnut requirements – i.e. a pattern of world development that 
respected environmental limits imposed by tipping points in critical earth system 
processes and achieved the social goal of eliminating poverty in its various di-
mensions (Raworth 2012). 6
Within country inequality and the catch-up motive, provide another reason for 
pursuing economic growth, including in rich countries. Each income class wants 
to achieve the standards of those with higher standards in their own society. In the 
absence of domestic redistribution, growth of output provides a partial solution, 
allowing (in principle) rising standards at all levels. Insofar as people’s well-
being is related to their position relative to others in society, continuous growth is 
needed even to keep in the same place. At the same time, richer classes promote 
growth so that they can meet the demands of lower-income groups for rising in-
comes without redistribution. Yet for higher-income countries, economic growth 
6 Raworth’s doughnut includes nine planetary boundaries and eleven social boundaries.
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does not appear to increase happiness or fulfilment (Easterlin 1974; Skidelsky 
– Skidelsky 2012). 
Redistribution within economies would permit poorer groups to catch up with 
richer ones and thus obviate the demand for growth. Inequality and the desire 
to catch up explains the paradox that every country, however well off, wants to 
grow, despite the evidence that growth does not increase well-being or happiness 
and is environmentally damaging.
5.2. International agreements
International agreements to regulate emissions obviously have a huge potential, 
as they impose equal costs on all participants in international trade and thus obvi-
ate the competitive incentive to maintain emissions. Would a more equal world 
be more likely to support such regulations? 
In the literature on regulation of the commons, arguments can be found on both 
sides: on the one hand, greater equality tends to increase trust and social cohe-
sion, and this is likely to make collective agreements more likely. This may be 
combined with Boyce’s proposition that the rich (and powerful) bear the costs of 
regulation and the poor the costs of lack of regulation, so that a world where in-
come and power is more evenly shared would be more likely to reach regulatory 
agreement. In addition, heterogeneity (of wealth, ethnicity, etc.) is often claimed 
to be an obstacle to reaching regulatory agreements (Varughese – Ostrom 2001).
On the other side of the argument, where all agents are “rational”, each must 
be convinced that they would suffer enough from non-regulation to justify the 
costs to them. A few very rich actors with a large share of output may be con-
vinced that it is in their own interests to regulate the commons, but with many 
equal agents collective action is more problematic, as individually each gains 
by not regulating (Olson 1965). Evidence from agreements to regulate the com-
mons within countries has been advanced on both sides of the argument. Koop 
– Tole (2001) find that the negative impact of development on deforestation is 
less where inequality is less. Surveying many arrangements to protect the com-
mons, Baland – Platteau (2007) find inequality makes regulation less acceptable, 
although they find no systematic relationship in unregulated settings. Others sug-
gest that substantial inequality is a bar to action, but some inequality helps (Baker 
1998; Molinas 1998).
Putting the argument into a global context where countries are the agents in-
volved, across countries there is considerable heterogeneity of nationality, reli-
gion, and ethnicity as well as of income, which makes it difficult for countries 
to recognise and value a common global interest. The unavoidable heterogeneity 
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of this kind is compounded by the heterogeneity of incomes. Poorer nations are 
loath to come to an agreement that will limit their ability to catch up, particularly 
when the vast mass of emissions has been caused by the historic actions of the 
richer countries. As Varughese – Ostrom (2001) argue, in the context of micro-
arrangements, institutions can overcome heterogeneity. High inequality among 
nations makes it difficult to agree on and secure respect for such institutions. 
While very large nations might, Olson-style, try to impose institutions and regu-
lations, these may well be thwarted so long as lower-income countries feel they 
are unfair. This conclusion is broadly reflected in the slow progress of global 
negotiations on action for climate change, made even more problematic by the 
pressures from carbon-producing industries. I would conclude that substantially 
more equality between nations would make effective global agreement on regula-
tion much more likely.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The issue of sustainability raises major issues of justice across and within genera-
tions. The “across” generation issue means we must limit total current emissions; 
this limit implies that a just distribution would involve equalisation of rights to 
emit within and across countries. This might be in conflict with the findings of 
what the most efficient distribution of emissions would be across and within 
countries – given that the evidence suggests that richer people and countries may 
have a lower MPE than poorer ones. Yet two further meta-arguments challenge 
this: first, the catch-up motive for growth, which would be modified with more 
equal distribution, consequently potentially reducing growth-related emissions; 
and secondly, the enhanced likelihood of coming to an enforceable global agree-
ment to limit emissions with more equality. The latter argument derives from the 
need for a sense of common global purpose, which is more likely to emerge with 
more equality across and within nations.
Finally, I return to the issue of how Kaldor might have viewed these questions. 
Undoubtedly, he would have agreed with the conclusions. But I think it is likely 
that he would have focused more on technology and the relationship between 
“solving” the emissions problem by technology without abandoning growth. Af-
ter all, endogeneity of technology was one of his fundamental insights.
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